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Abstract 
Mortgage credit expansion policies – such as UK’s Help to Buy (HtB) – aim to increase access to and 
affordability of owner-occupied housing and are widespread around the world. We take advantage of spatial 
discontinuities in the HtB equity loan scheme, introduced in 2013, to explore the causal economic impacts and 
the effectiveness of this type of policies. Employing a Difference-in-Discontinuities design, we find that HtB 
increased house prices by more than the expected present value of the implied interest rate subsidy and had no 
discernible effect on construction volumes in the Greater London Authority (GLA), where housing supply is 
subject to severe long-run constraints and housing is already extremely unaffordable. HtB did increase 
construction numbers without affecting prices near the English/Welsh border, an area with less binding supply 
constraints and comparably affordable housing. HtB also led to bunching of newly built units below the price 
threshold, building of smaller new units and an improvement in the financial performance of developers. We 
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1. Introduction
Government policies directed at stimulating supply or demand in mortgage markets are 
common throughout the world. Examples of credit market interventions include mortgage 
interest deductions in countries as diverse as the United States, India or Sweden, mortgage 
guarantees in the United States or the Netherlands, and government loans for home purchases 
in France or the United Kingdom. Most of these interventions have the explicit goal of making 
homeownership more affordable and thus accessible. In a context in which housing 
affordability problems are increasingly pervasive, especially in large desirable cities, new 
policies are discussed – if not implemented – frequently. In this paper, we exploit a unique 
setting – spatial discontinuities in an equity loan scheme – to shed light on the economic impacts 
and the effectiveness of publicly-funded credit market expansion policies, and, in particular of 
government equity loans.  
In April 2013, the British government launched a new flagship housing credit policy: Help to 
Buy (HtB). The program was initially implemented in England, but Welsh and Scottish versions 
were put in place shortly thereafter. We set out to explore the causal impact of HtB on housing 
construction, house prices, the size of newly constructed units and the financial performance of 
residential developers. To do so, we focus on the HtB ‘Equity Loan Scheme’, which provides 
an equity loan for up to 20% of the housing unit’s value – or 40% within the Greater London 
Authority (GLA) – to buyers of new build properties. The Equity Loan Scheme is by far the 
most salient and popular of the four HtB schemes and the one requiring the biggest budget. It 
is often referred to simply as “Help to Buy” and henceforth, unless we note otherwise, when 
we refer to HtB we mean the Equity Loan Scheme.1  
HtB expands housing credit and thus increases demand for housing. To explore how such a 
positive demand shock in the housing market affects construction and prices, we develop a 
simple theoretical framework with heterogeneous households and credit constraints. Our model 
predicts that the impact of the policy depends crucially on the responsiveness of supply to 
prices. In a setting with responsive supply, HtB can be expected to mainly stimulate 
construction numbers as intended by the policy. However, when supply is unresponsive (i.e., 
1 At the time of implementation, HtB consisted of four schemes; the Equity Loan Scheme, Mortgage Guarantees, 
Shared Ownership, and Individual Savings Accounts (ISA). All four schemes aim to help credit constrained 
households to buy a property. The Mortgage Guarantees scheme ceased at the end of 2016. The HtB-ISA closes 
for new entrants in November 2019 and any bonus must be claimed by 2030. In April 2017, the British government 
introduced a new Lifetime ISA scheme. In contrast to HtB ISA, it is only open to individuals aged 18-39 and the 
money saved can also be used to fund a pension.  
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regulatory constraints or physical barriers to residential development impede a supply-
response), the effect of the policy may be mainly to increase house prices, with the unintended 
consequence of making housing less rather than more affordable.  
We implement a Difference-in-Discontinuity design to compare changes in house prices and 
construction activities across jurisdictional boundaries. We separately analyze properties sold 
on either side of the GLA boundary and on either side of the English/Welsh border. In both 
cases we only consider housing purchases close to the respective boundaries. As pointed out 
above, in Wales the scheme was put in place later and it only applied to a subset of the properties 
that were eligible in England. Likewise, the London scheme that was implemented in 2016 
offered larger government equity loans (as a share of house values) for dwellings inside the 
GLA compared to those available for purchase outside the GLA. Our main estimates exploit 
these spatial discontinuities to study the effect of HtB on house prices and construction activity. 
We also use this design to study the impact of the scheme on the size of newly constructed 
units. 
We focus on the GLA boundary and the English/Welsh border for two reasons. First, our 
research design requires spatial discontinuities in the scheme’s conditions, which can be found 
at these boundaries. Second, the two areas differ starkly in their regulatory land use 
restrictiveness and in barriers to physical development: While the GLA is the most supply 
constrained and the least affordable area in the UK – and arguably one of the most supply 
constrained areas in the world – housing supply is comparably responsive to demand shocks 
near the English/Welsh border.2  
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that differences in the intensity of the HtB-
treatment have heterogeneous effects depending on local supply conditions. In the GLA, where 
supply is relatively unresponsive to price changes, the introduction of the more generous 
London version of the Equity Loan Scheme led to a significant increase in prices for new build 
units of roughly 6%. However, it had no appreciable effect on construction activity. Conversely, 
in the areas around the English/Welsh border, where only a small fraction of land is developed 
and developable land is readily available, we find a significant effect on construction activity 
and no effect on prices. The introduction of the more generous HtB-price threshold on the 
English side of the border increased the likelihood of a new build sale by about 8% (compared 
to the Welsh side of the border). Consistent with this, a bunching analysis reveals that HtB led 
2 We provide supporting evidence for this proposition in Section 3.2. 
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to significant bunching of properties right below the price threshold, shifting construction away 
from larger properties above the threshold towards smaller units. We also provide evidence 
indicating that the scheme caused an improvement of the financial performance of developers; 
larger revenues as well as higher gross and net profits. 
Collectively, these results suggest that the effects of HtB largely depend on local supply 
conditions. We find that the scheme fails to trigger more construction activity, but instead 
causes house prices to increase inside the GLA, precisely the region that is most affected by the 
‘affordability crisis’. This has distributional implications. The main beneficiaries of HtB in 
already unaffordable areas may be developers and landowners rather than struggling first-time 
buyers; while access to homeownership is improved in principle (credit constraints are relaxed), 
the present value of the financial burden associated with the purchase of a home further 
increases. 
Our paper relates to previous studies looking at the effects of credit conditions and credit market 
policies on housing markets. Previous research in this vast literature has mainly focused on the 
effect of credit supply on house prices (see Stein 1995, Ortalo-Magné and Rady 2006, Mian et 
al. 2009, Duca et al. 2011, Favara and Imbs 2015). These and other studies provide theoretical 
and empirical credence to the notion that expansions in credit supply lead to higher prices, 
especially in areas with tight planning conditions. On the policy evaluation front, several studies 
have explored the impact of demand subsidies on housing market outcomes. Hilber and Turner 
(2014) examine the impact of the U.S. mortgage interest deduction (MID). They find that the 
MID boosts homeownership attainment only of higher income households in markets with lax 
land use regulation. In tightly regulated markets with inelastic long-run supply of housing, the 
MID lowers homeownership attainment, presumably because higher house prices also raise 
down-payment constraints of would-be-buyers. Sommer and Sullivan (2018) estimate a 
dynamic structural model of the housing market to study the effect of removing the MID and 
predict this would result in a substantial reduction in house prices. Finally, a significant 
literature has studied the effect of credit expansion policies in the US – such as FHFA 
guarantees and GSE lending – on homeownership attainment, finding mixed results.3  Our 
analysis contributes to this literature by documenting how a credit expansion-policy affects 
prices, construction activity and developer performance. We interpret our results as the 
3 See for example Bostic and Gabriel (2006), Gabriel and Rosenthal (2010) and Fetter (2013). Olsen and Zabel 
(2015) review the US literature. A comparison of US policies with policies in the UK and Switzerland can be 
found in Hilber and Schöni (2016). An evaluation of the French Pret a Taux Zero policy – which provides a down-
payment subsidy to low and middle-income first-time buyers can be found in Gobillon and le Blanc (2008). 
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predictable outcome of an exogenous credit expansion shock, which helps link our estimates to 
the broader literature on mortgage supply and housing markets. 
Only a very limited number of studies have shed light on the effects of HtB on housing and 
mortgage markets. Finlay et al. (2016) estimate that since its introduction HtB has generated 
43% additional new homes. They conclude that the scheme has been successful in increasing 
housing supply. While their analysis combines quantitative and qualitative methods, their study 
lacks proper identification of the effects using a rigorous empirical approach. Szumilo and 
Vanino (2018) use a spatial discontinuity approach similar to the one employed here but focus 
their analysis on the effect of HtB on lending volumes only. Benetton et al. (2019) explore the 
effect of HtB on households’ house purchase and financing decisions. Applying a Difference-
in-Difference strategy, they find that households take advantage of an increase in the HtB 
maximum equity limit to buy more expensive properties. To date, we have no state-of-the-art 
evaluation of the impacts of the policy on house prices and construction volumes. Our paper 
aims to address this.  
Finally, this paper links to previous research on housing and land supply, including work on the 
effects of supply constraints on the responsiveness of housing markets to economic shocks 
(Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016), the origin of supply restrictions (Saiz 2010, Hilber and Robert-
Nicoud, 2013) and their consequences (see Gyourko and Molloy 2015 and the references 
therein). We contribute to this literature by studying in depth the effect on housing supply of 
arguably the most important new British housing policy since the implementation of Right to 
Buy in 1980. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the details of the HtB Equity 
Loan Scheme and provides a simple theoretical framework to guide the empirical analysis. 
Section 3 outlines our empirical strategy and discusses the results.  Section 4 concludes. 
2. Background and Theoretical Framework
2.1. Background: The Help to Buy Equity Loan Scheme 
Since the launch of HtB in April 2013 until September 2018, over 195,000 properties were 
bought with a government equity loan provided by the scheme. The total value of these loans 
is £10.7 billion, with the value of the properties purchased under the scheme totaling £49.9 
billion (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government 2019).4  
4 The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2019) provides a comprehensive overview and 
numerous summary statistics relating to the HtB Equity Loan Scheme.  
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The English version of the HtB Equity Loan Scheme offers government loans of up to 20% of 
a unit value to households seeking to buy a new residence. It is available to both first-time 
buyers and home-movers but it is restricted to the purchase of new build units with prices under 
£600,000. Given that the prevalent maximum Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios offered by British 
banks to first-time buyers were around 75% during this period, the scheme offers a substantial 
reduction in the down-payment needed to buy a property. With the government loan covering 
part of the down-payment, buyers are only required to raise 5% of the property value as a 
deposit. The explicit goal of the Equity Loan Scheme is that this reduction in the deposit 
required to the borrower helps households overcome credit constraints.  
The Equity Loan Scheme can also help reduce household borrowing costs by reducing interest 
payments on the combined loan. This occurs via two channels. The first is that no interest or 
loan fees on the equity loan have to be paid by the borrower for the first five years after the 
purchase of the house. Subsequently, there is a charge, which depends on the rate of inflation. 
We calculate the implied subsidy provided through this channel in Section 3.7. Secondly, by 
raising the combined deposit to 25%, the equity loan keeps borrowers away from high-LTV, 
high-interest products available in the commercial mortgage market.5 
The government equity loan can be repaid at any time without penalty. However, unless they 
want to sell the property, borrowers do not need to repay the loan at all. When they sell, the 
government will reclaim its 20% equity stake of the sale price. The government thus participates 
in capital gains and losses. 
In our analysis we exploit differences between the English, Welsh and London versions of the 
Equity Loan Scheme. The Welsh scheme was introduced in January 2014 and provided support 
for the purchase of properties with prices under £300,000.6 The London scheme was introduced 
in February 2016 and offered an equity loan of up to 40% of the unit’s price for properties under 
£600,000 located within the GLA. The regional differences in the scheme are summarized in 
Table 1.  
One important feature of the different loan schemes is that they are only available for the 
purchase of newly built properties. This condition is intended to leverage the increase in 
5 This enables households to gain access to more attractive mortgage rates from lenders who participate in the 
scheme. Eligibility conditions require borrowers to have a suitable credit score and to be able to cover the monthly 
repayments. 
6 Scotland also introduced a HtB Equity Loan Scheme during 2014; however, we are not able to exploit the 
discontinuities at the English/Scottish border. This is because the Scottish Land Registry did not identify new build 
units until 2018. 
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demand for these properties with the ultimate aim of triggering a supply response. It implies 
that demand faced by residential developers, construction companies and other actors in the 
construction sector will increase with the policy. We use information from these companies’ 
accounting data to estimate the effect of the policy on their financial performance. 
2.2. Theoretical Framework 
In this sub-section we develop a theoretical framework to guide our empirical analysis. 7 
Specifically, we develop a simple model of the housing market with heterogeneous households, 
featuring credit constraints and endogenous housing supply. It is a partial equilibrium model in 
that we abstract from potential effects of changing credit conditions for new builds on the price 
of the existing stock.  
The framework illustrates how a relaxation of credit conditions affects housing quantities and 
prices, and how these effects depend on the costs of developing new stock. A relaxation of 
credit constraints leads to both an increase in prices and an expansion in quantities. Under 
suitable assumptions – made explicit below – the relative magnitude of the two effects depends 
on the responsiveness of supply to prices. For low (high) supply responsiveness, the price effect 
is stronger (weaker) and the quantity effect weaker (stronger). The theoretical insights from this 
framework can be summarized by the cross-elasticities of quantity and prices taken over the 
credit conditions parameter and a building cost shifter.8 We also show how a relaxation of credit 
conditions can increase developer profits. 
Suppose a two-period economy with a unit mass of households with preferences over a 
numeraire consumption good 𝑐 and housing ℎ, as given by a period utility 𝑢(𝑐, ℎ) which is 
continuous, strictly increasing and differentiable in both arguments. Assume in addition that 
lim
ℎ→∞
𝑢(𝑐, ℎ) = ∞ if 𝑐 > 0 and 𝑢(𝑐, ℎ) > 0 ∀𝑐, ℎ > 0. Households enjoy utility at the end of 
periods 1 and 2, and the discount factor is β>0. 
Households can only obtain ℎ > 0 if they buy a new unit and obtain housing consumption 
normalized to 0 otherwise. We can think of these alternatives either as a choice between renting 
and buying. In this interpretation, this formulation is similar to those used in models featuring 
warm-glow from ownership (Iacoviello and Pavan 2013, Kiyotaki et al. 2011, Carozzi 2019). 
7 The model builds on Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) who consider a similar setting but abstract from the role of 
credit conditions. 
8 The model presented here introduces credit conditions via a change in required loan-to-value ratios (LTVs), as 
is customary in the literature. We treat housing as homogeneous, with all built units being identical in the utility 
they provide to households, but heterogeneous in development costs.  
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The role of the assumption is to ensure that demand for new build units is determined solely by 
credit conditions.  
Households receive an endowment 𝑒 in period 1 and a location specific income 𝑤 in period 2 
which can be used for consumption or to buy property. Households are heterogeneous in the 
initial endowment  𝑒 , which is continuously distributed over the unit interval [0,1]  with 
cumulative density function 𝐹𝑒. In period 2, income is 𝑤.  
New build units are homogeneous and can be bought in period 1 for an endogenous price P. 
Credit is available for the purchase of property, yet a minimum down-payment is required 
corresponding to a fraction (1 − 𝛾) of the property value. Credit and savings pay interest 𝑟. We 
assume that 𝑤 >
𝛾
1−𝛾
(1 + 𝑟) which ensures that, for sufficiently large ℎ, demand for new build 
units is determined solely by the credit constraint.9 Hence, demand is given by the mass of 
agents that can afford a down-payment  𝑄𝐷 = 1 − 𝐹𝑒((1 − 𝛾)𝑃) . Note that demand is
downward sloping as the function 𝐹𝑒 is strictly increasing.  
There is a unit mass of developable land which can be used to build – at most – a unit mass of 
housing units. Development costs for new build units depend on local supply conditions and 
are heterogeneous across land plots. We assume that the development costs are uniformly 
distributed in the [0, 𝜈] interval, with 𝜈(1 − 𝛾) > 1. We assume land is owned by competitive 
firms which will develop their plot if the price is smaller than or equal to development costs. 
As a result, the new build inverse supply curve for competitive developers is given by 𝑃 = 𝜈𝑄. 
High values of 𝜈 correspond to higher average development costs and, therefore, to a weaker 
response of quantities to a change in prices. Conversely, low values of  𝜈 are associated with a 
more responsive supply schedule (i.e. a flatter supply curve). We can substitute this expression 
in demand to obtain an implicit definition for new build equilibrium quantities: 
𝑄∗ = (1 − 𝐹𝑒((1 − 𝛾)𝜈𝑄
∗)) (1) 
By differentiating this expression, we can obtain the following four statements regarding the 
responses of equilibrium prices and quantities to changes in credit conditions ( 𝛾) , and 












> 0 (2) 
9 Note that 𝑃 ≤
1
1−𝛾
. Assumption  𝑤 >
𝛾
1−𝛾
(1 + 𝑟) will therefore ensure that in period 2 all agents are able to pay 
the remaining part of any loans taken for the purchase of a property, including interest. Large enough ℎ ensures 
buying property in period 1 is incentive compatible for all households. See theoretical Appendix. 
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The first two inequalities indicate that an increase in development costs results in a reduction 
in equilibrium quantities and an increase in equilibrium prices. 10  The third and fourth 
inequalities mean that both quantities and prices respond positively to an expansion of credit. 
This follows from the increase in demand associated with a credit expansion. The extent to 
which a change in credit conditions will translate into a change in quantities or prices depends 
on both the distribution of the initial endowment 𝐹𝑒  and the price responsiveness of supply 
(through 𝜈).  
Proposition 1 – The effect of a credit expansion on prices and quantities depends on the 
distribution of development costs, as measured by 𝜈. Specifically, if 𝑒 is uniformly distributed 







Proof: See theoretical Appendix 
Proposition 1 states that, under the specified parameter conditions, the effect of credit on 
quantities will be smaller, and the effect on prices larger, in high 𝜈 markets (i.e., in markets 
with tighter supply constraints and thus more inelastic long-run supply of housing). This 
intuition will help us account for regional differences in our estimates of the impact of Help to 
Buy reported in the next sections.  
The assumption of uniform endowments is a sufficient condition, but it is not necessary. 
Intuitively, this assumption results in linear demand curves. In the theoretical Appendix we 
show that without linear demand curves either the first or the second inequality is not satisfied. 
Hence, the conclusions derived from the uniform case may or may not follow with more general 
assumptions on the distribution of endowments. This ex-ante ambiguity partly motivates the 
empirical analysis below. 
The statements in the derivatives in (2), as well as Proposition 1, are derived for the case of 
competitive land and housing markets. Proposition 2 states that an expansion of credit will 
result in an increase in total developer profits. 
Proposition 2 – A credit expansion will result in an increase in total developer profits. That is, 
the sum of equilibrium profits across developers Π(P) is increasing in 𝛾.  
Proof: See theoretical Appendix 
This result hinges on the assumption that developers own all land, preventing entry from other 
firms from eroding profits. The notion that developers have some degree of market power is 
10 See proofs in theoretical Appendix. 
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reasonable in our case, as the residential construction market is characterized by substantial 
concentration and high returns. We test empirically whether Proposition 2 is satisfied in Section 
3. 
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our empirical analysis employs geo-located data on housing sales in England and Wales, 
including information on unit characteristics and transaction prices. Our main data source is the 
Land Registry Price Paid Dataset (or short ‘Land Registry’), which covers most residential and 
all new build residential transactions in England and Wales. The dataset includes property sales 
from 1995 to 2018, recording the transaction price, postcode, address, the date the sale was 
registered (which proxies for the transaction date), and categorical data on dwelling type 
(detached, semi-detached, flat or terrace), tenure (freehold or leasehold) and whether the home 
is a new build property. We use the National Statistics Postcode Lookup Directory to match 
properties in the dataset to coordinates and wards. 
Over the period between 2012 and 2018, the Land Registry recorded 700,338 sales of new 
housing units. We use the sale of these units as a proxy for construction activity. All sales are 
geo-coded using address postcodes. In our spatial discontinuity analysis, we select all the new 
build transactions near the GLA boundary and the English/Welsh border.  Specifically, we 
select all new build transactions within 5km from the GLA boundary and within 10km from the 
English/Welsh border.11 We use a 10km bandwidth for the latter exercise because transactions 
near the English/Welsh border are sparser. We also use areas near the Greater Manchester 
boundary in a placebo test.12 
In addition, we use Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) data that contains information on the 
floor area and other physical characteristics of newly built units. We match this data to the Land 
Registry in order to augment the latter dataset with additional information on the transacted 
newly built units.13 Demographic neighborhood characteristics at ward level are collected from 
11 The number of transactions for the resulting samples are reported in Appendix Table B1. This table also reports 
sample sizes for smaller bands around the respective boundaries. 
12 Greater Manchester is the second largest travel to work area in the United Kingdom and arguably the one most 
comparable to London.   
13 EPCs provide information on buildings that consumers plan to purchase or rent. Since 2007 an EPC has been 
required whenever a home is constructed or marketed for social rent, private rent or sale. We use a dataset that 
contains all EPCs issued between 2008 and 2019. The dataset includes the type of transaction that triggered the 
EPC, the energy performance of properties and their physical characteristics. Following Koster and Pinchbeck 
(2017), we merge the EPC data into the Land Registry using a sequential match strategy. First, we match a Land 
Registry sale to certificates using the primary address object name (PAON; typically, the house number or name), 
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the 2011 Census and used as controls. We include the fraction of married residents, and the 
fraction of residents with level-4 and above educational qualifications.   
In Panel A of Table 2, we present summary statistics for the sample of new build sales located 
within 5 kilometers of the GLA boundary taking place between January 2012 to December 
2018. There are 32,127 newly built property transactions in this area. The average house price 
is £394,703, and the average size of these properties is 87.3 square meters. Panel B of Table 2 
shows the descriptive statistics for the baseline sample of new build transactions within 10 
kilometers of the English/Welsh border from 2012 to 2018. The average house price in this 
region is £234,202, and the average size of these properties is 102.2 square meters. 
When estimating the effect of the policy on housing construction, we assemble a ward by month 
panel using data from January 2012 to December 2018. We obtain ward-level observations by 
aggregating from individual new build sales. Panels C and D of Table 2 document the 
descriptive statistics of our estimation sample for the construction effect. The datasets for the 
GLA boundary-area and the English/Welsh border-area consist of 401 wards and 195 wards 
respectively. The propensity to have at least one new build transaction in any month and ward 
is 0.22 for the GLA sample and 0.18 for the English/Welsh sample. On average, 0.95 new units 
are built each month in a ward near the GLA boundary and 0.52 near the English/Welsh border. 
To conduct our analysis of developer performance, we construct a developer/construction 
company panel that covers 84 companies during the period 2010 to 2018. The panel includes 
financial information of these companies from Orbis. It also includes information on whether 
or not the companies are registered with a HtB agency. A builder must be registered with one 
of the regional government offices managing the scheme for its properties to be eligible for a 
HtB equity loan. The full sample of 84 developers is our Difference-in-Differences sample. In 
addition, we include hand-coded data on the fraction of properties sold through the scheme 
from annual reports in a selected sample of 30 residential developers. This is our intensity 
sample. The large sample of 84 companies is obtained after combining a list of the main builders 
in the United Kingdom from Zoopla – one of the main property websites in the country – and 
secondary address object name (SAON; typically, the identification of separate unit/flat), street name, and full 
postcode. We then retain the certificate that is closest in days to the sale or take the median value of characteristics 
where there is more than one EPC in the same year as the sale. We repeat this exercise for unmatched properties 
but allow one of the PAONs or SAONs to be different. Our final round of matching is on the full postcode. The 
matched dataset provides us total floor area; whether the property has a fireplace or not; total energy consumption 
and total CO2 emission of the property.  
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financial data from Orbis. This list includes residential developers, commercial developers and 
construction companies.  
3.2. The Role of Local Supply Conditions 
Below, we report separate estimates of the impact of the generosity of HtB schemes obtained 
from a sample of properties near the GLA boundary, and a sample of properties near the 
English/Welsh. We choose these two areas because they both provide an ideal quasi-natural 
setting to identify the economic effects of HtB. We also report estimates using the area near the 
Greater Manchester boundary for our placebo tests, as the same generosity of the English HtB 
scheme does not change at that boundary.  
One crucial difference between our two focal areas – the area near the GLA boundary and the 
area near the English/Welsh border – is that the former has overall vastly less responsive supply, 
driven by both, tighter local planning regulations and a relative scarcity of undeveloped 
developable land. As shown above, theory suggests that the positive impact of HtB on house 
prices should be much larger – and the positive impact on new construction much smaller – in 
the area near the GLA boundary.  
In order to illustrate the differences in supply conditions between the areas, we employ a 
number of measures that capture long-term housing supply constraints. These measures are the 
share of land designated as green belt (provided by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and 
Local Government), the average planning application refusal rate taken over the period from 
1979 to 2008, the average share of developed developable land, and the average elevation range 
(all derived from Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). We calculate these measures for the three areas 
employed in our analysis using Local Planning Authority (LPA)-level data and LPA surface 
areas as weights.14  
Table 3 (rows 1 to 4) illustrates the differences in supply conditions between the three areas. 
The most striking difference between the two focal areas lies in the share of ‘green belt’ land. 
Land in green belts is typically off limits for any development (residential or commercial) and 
thus represents a ‘horizontal’ supply constraint. This share is 66.5% for boroughs along the 
boundary of the GLA but only 3.8% for English boroughs along the English/Welsh border. 
Another measure to capture physical supply constraints is the share of developable land already 
14 We do not currently have data for LPAs on the Welsh side of the English/Welsh border. We expect that the 
differences between the GLA and the English/Welsh border area will be even more striking when taking account 
of the data from the Welsh LPAs. 
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developed. This share is 27.6% for boroughs along the GLA boundary but only 6.3% for 
English boroughs along the English/Welsh border.  
The arguably quantitatively most important long-term supply constraint are restrictions 
imposed by the British planning system (Hilber and Vermeulen 2016). The weighted average 
of this refusal rate is 35.6% for boroughs along the GLA boundary and 27.2% for English 
boroughs along the English/Welsh border.  
While the area near the English/Welsh border is subject to greater topographical (slope related) 
supply constraints, Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) demonstrate that these constraints, while 
statistically significant, are quantitatively unimportant in explaining local price-earnings 
elasticities.  
Lastly, it is important to point out that the area near the GLA boundary is not only characterized 
by vastly more restrictive supply conditions, but these constraints are also significantly more 
binding in practice, simply because aggregate housing demand there is much stronger. To 
illustrate this point, consider a ten-story height restriction in the heart of a superstar city such 
as London and compare it to the same constraint in the desert. The restriction is extremely 
binding in the former location, while completely irrelevant in the latter. 
To explore the differences in supply responsiveness across the three areas further, we employ 
the estimated coefficients from Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) to compute an implied house 
price-earnings elasticity. Table 3 (rows 5 and 6) reports our estimated elasticities based on these 
coefficients. Using the OLS estimates, we find that the price-earnings elasticity along the GLA 
boundary (0.40) is higher than that of the area along the Greater Manchester boundary (0.28), 
which in turn is higher than the elasticity near the English/Welsh border (0.25). As two of the 
three supply constraints measures employed in their estimation, refusal rate and share 
developed land, are likely endogenous, we employ the instrumental variable strategy proposed 
in Hilber and Vermeulen (2016). This provides exogenous variation in our supply constraint 
measures, which we use to re-compute the unbiased price-earnings elasticities. The rank order 
remains unchanged. The GLA has again the highest elasticity (0.21) followed by Greater 
Manchester (0.16) and the English/Welsh border area (0.13). 
The higher price-earnings elasticity along GLA boundary suggests that, due to local supply 
constraints, housing prices respond more strongly to a given change in local housing demand. 
This also suggests a lower supply price elasticity in the GLA boundary area. In the next section, 
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we outline our identification strategy and discuss how we measure the impact of HtB on house 
prices and construction activity. 
3.3. Identification Strategy and Empirical Specifications 
Our empirical strategy is designed to test the impact of HtB on housing construction and house 
prices. We exploit spatial differences in the intensity of the HtB policy. As mentioned above, 
HtB Wales was rolled out nine months later than in England and offered a government-backed 
loan for the purchase of new build properties under £300,000 (£600,000 in England). There 
were also differences in the intensity of the HtB policy between the GLA and its surroundings, 
starting in 2016. In this case, the difference lies in the size of the government-backed loan 
available to households. London-HtB offers loans of up to 40% of a new build’s value, while 
this figure is 20% elsewhere (i.e., outside the GLA boundary). We exploit these regional policy 
differences in a Difference-in-Discontinuities design combining time variation in prices and 
new build construction with local variation in policy intensity around the regional boundaries.  
The samples of new build properties used in the analyses of prices and construction effects near 
the GLA boundary and the English/Welsh border are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, 
respectively.15 Our boundary approach is meant to ensure that we are comparing properties 
affected by similar economic and amenity shocks, as compared to a standard Difference-in-
Differences strategy that simply takes whole regions as control groups. The identifying 
assumption in both cases can be likened to the typical assumption of parallel trends: in the 
absence of the policy, prices and construction on either side of the boundary would have 
followed a parallel evolution over time. Figures 3 and 4 depict the evolution of house prices at 
both sides of the GLA boundary and English/Welsh border, respectively, and indicate that 
prices moved in parallel prior to the implementation of the policy.16 Figures 5 and 6 depict the 
average number of units built by ward at the GLA boundary and English/Welsh border, 
respectively. Again, we see that the evolution of building activity followed reasonably parallel 
trends prior to the implementation of the policy. 
In addition to studying the effect of the policy on prices and construction activity, we also 
estimate the impact on HtB on developers’ profits, and document evidence of substantial 
15 Appendix Figure A1 depicts the corresponding map for our placebo sample of new build sales near the Greater 
Manchester boundary. 
16 The price index is constructed by estimating a linear regression of log prices on property characteristics (property 
type dummies for detached, semidetached and terraced properties, property size, a leasehold dummy, measures of 
energy efficiency) and postcode fixed effects. The lines in Figures 3 and 4 correspond to time dummies included 
in that specification.  
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bunching of new build property prices around the eligibility thresholds for England (£600,000) 
and Wales. These specific analyses further clarify developers’ responses to the policy. 
3.3.1. Specification: Impact of Help to Buy on House Prices 
The HtB policy is meant to operate as a relaxation of households’ credit constraints. Hence, it 
can lead to an increase in demand for new builds, and as a result, to an increase in the price of 
new builds. To test this, we use observed transactions of new build units located near the 
boundary of the GLA and the English/Welsh border in two Difference-in-Discontinuities 
analyses. We conduct both exercises separately. To estimate the magnitude of these differences 
in our Difference-in-Discontinuities framework we estimate:  
ln(𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡) = 𝜙𝑝 + 𝛽𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖+𝜏
′𝑍𝑗 × 𝑑𝑦 + 𝛾𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 × 𝑑𝑦 + 𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 (3) 
where 𝑖 indexes individual properties, j indexes the (ward-level) neighborhood, p indexes the 
postcode (within a ward), 𝑡 indexes the month, and y indexes the year. The variable 𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑖 is a 
dummy that takes value 1 in the region with a more generous HtB policy (i.e. inside the GLA 
or on the English side of the English/Welsh border), and the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 represents a dummy 
taking value 1 if individual transaction 𝑖 occurs after the difference in policy takes place. A 
vector of postcode fixed effects is represented by 𝜙𝑝, 𝛿𝑡 is a set of (year-month) time dummies, 
𝑋𝑖 is a set of individual housing characteristics, and 𝑍𝑗 are neighborhood characteristics at the 
ward level (from the 2011 Census) interacted with year dummies 𝑑𝑦.  
After we control for postcode fixed effects, we include the distance to the boundary interacted 
with year dummies 𝑑𝑦 to account for potential time varying shocks that differ spatially.
17 We
estimate this equation by OLS, clustering standard errors at the postcode-level to account for 
potential spatial correlation in local price shocks. This is estimated on properties within a 
bandwidth around the corresponding boundary. In the case of the London HtB, we use a 5km 
bandwidth around the GLA boundary. We use a 10km bandwidth around the English/Welsh 
border. In the robustness checks section, we show that our results are robust to alternative 
bandwidth choices. 
Our parameter of interest is 𝛽. It measures the effect of differences in the intensity of the HtB 
policy on the price of new build properties.  
3.3.2. Specification: Impact of Help to Buy on Housing Construction 
17 In an alternative specification, we omit the postcode fixed effects and control flexibly for distance to the 
boundary by estimating different linear terms in the distance, specified separately on either side. 
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The government’s equity loan is available only for the purchase of new build units. In this way, 
the government attempts to ensure the policy triggers additional residential construction. In 
order to test whether this is the case, we estimate the effect of differences in the intensity of the 
policy on construction activity. We again use a Difference-in-Discontinuities specification. 
This exercise is conducted by aggregating new build counts at the ward level for every month. 
We estimate: 
𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡 = 𝜔𝑗 + 𝛽𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑗 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜏
′𝑍𝑗 × 𝑑𝑦 + 𝛾𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 × 𝑑𝑦 + 𝑗𝑡 (4) 
where 𝑗  indexes wards, 𝑡  indexes months, and y indexes years. The dependent variable is 
now 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡, which can represent either the number of new build transactions in ward 𝑗 
and period 𝑡, or a dummy taking value 1 if there are any new build sales in ward 𝑗 and period 𝑡. 
The variable 𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑗 is a dummy taking value 1 in the area with a more generous HtB policy (i.e., 
inside the GLA boundary or on the English side of the English/Welsh border), and the variable 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−12  represents a dummy that takes value 1 if transactions in ward 𝑗  occur after the 
difference in policy arises. The variable is lagged by twelve months to account for the likely 
delayed response of construction to the policy shock.18 We include a set of ward fixed effects, 
represented by 𝜔𝑗  and time fixed effects 𝛿𝑡 .
19 𝑍𝑗  are neighborhood characteristics (from the
2011 Census) interacted with year dummies 𝑑𝑦. In addition to controlling for ward fixed effects, 
we include the distance to the boundary interacted with year dummies to account for potential 
time varying shocks that differ spatially. In all specifications we cluster standard errors at the 
ward level to account for potential spatial correlation. We estimate our specification using 
observations within 5km of the boundary in the case of the London GLA, and 10km in the case 
of the English/Welsh border.  
Our parameter of interest is 𝛽, which measures the effect of differences in the intensity of HtB 
on new construction. The differences in intensity are not the same across the English/Welsh 
border and across the GLA boundary. Therefore, we obtain separate estimates for these two 
exercises.  
3.3.3 Help to buy and Developers’ Financial Performance 
As indicated in Proposition 2, the increase in demand for newly built housing induced by HtB 
should positively impact the financial performance of firms participating in the scheme. The 
18 As a robustness check, we estimate a contemporaneous specification. Construction lags in the UK tend to be 
long by international standards, often in excess of 12 months.  
19 We also provide estimates that are obtained by controlling flexibly for distance to the boundary, omitting ward 
fixed effects. 
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policy should induce an increase in revenue of existing developers.20 Moreover, barriers to 
entry and imperfect competition in the housing production and land markets imply that the 
policy should translate into increased profits. This, however, depends on whether the increase 
in revenues is neutralized by an increase in the costs of land after the implementation of the 
policy.21 Uncovering how HtB affected the performance of developers can therefore identify 
some of the beneficiaries of this policy. 
To study this empirically, we use our developer dataset, covering 84 large British developers 
and construction companies. The dataset includes information on developers’ financial 
performance and, crucially, on the participation of these firms in HtB. We use our dataset to 
compare how the change in the performance of firms before and after 2012 varied with their 
participation in the scheme. For this purpose, we estimate a fixed effect model specified as: 
𝐹𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑘 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡 (5) 
𝐹𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑘𝑡  is an indicator of various measures of financial performance for 
developer 𝑘 in year 𝑡. We look at turnover (i.e. total revenues), gross profits, net profits before 
taxes, the difference between gross and net profits, and the salary cost of employees. The latter 
two variables are crude proxy measures for the pay packages of the senior management. The 
measure 𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑘 captures whether a developer participates in the program. We use two different 
definitions of this variable depending on the information available and therefore conduct the 
analysis on two separate samples. Our intensity sample consists of the 30 developers, for which 
we know the fraction of the units produced that were sold under the HtB scheme. We average 
this figure over time to obtain a time-invariant average fraction of units per developer. Our 
second definition of 𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑘 is based on the registry of developers in regional HtB offices across 
the country. In this case, the variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the developer is included in 
the registry. The information on registrations is available across a larger group of firms, so we 
can estimate this specification for our larger Difference-in-Differences sample of 84 
developers. Variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a variable taking value 1 after 2012. Finally, 𝛼𝑘 is a developer 
fixed-effect and 𝛿𝑡 represents a set of year dummies. 
Estimates of 𝛽  will measure the impact of the policy of firms and revenues under the 
assumption that unobservables 𝑘𝑡  are uncorrelated with 𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑘 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  conditional on 
individual and year effects. Because firms actively self-select into the program, the identifying 
20 The increased supply could in principle be taken up exclusively by new entrants. Yet the presence of economies 
of scale in housing production and the learning curve required to navigate the British planning system mean the 
volume of new entrants will probably be very small. 
21 In our model, this is ruled out because land is owned by developers, so land rents are included in profits. 
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assumption requires that the difference in performance between firms that self-select into the 
scheme and those that do not is fixed over time. That is, we assume other shocks to performance 
during the 2010-2018 period are uncorrelated with program participation.  
3.3.4. Bunching Analysis 
The English HtB policy is only available for properties purchased under 600,000 GBP. We can 
use this threshold to study bunching of property sales close to this price level. In doing so, we 
apply some of the methods recently developed in Chetty et al. (2011), Kleven (2016) and Best 
and Kleven (2017). The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. First, it allows us to test whether 
HtB induced a change in the type of properties supplied by developers. In addition, a bunching 
analysis provides an alternative method to study the effect of the policy on building volumes.  
We first document that indeed there is substantial bunching at the £600,000 price threshold. 
Next, we construct a counterfactual price distribution for new builds using information on sales 
excluding the region around the bunching thresholds. Following Kleven (2016), we estimate 
this counterfactual distribution by calculating the number of new build transactions in 5000 
GBP bins and use these to estimate: 
𝑆𝑙𝑡 = ∑ 𝑝𝑙𝑡
𝑞3
𝑞=0 + ∑ 𝜌𝑟1 {
𝑝𝑗
𝑟
∈ ℕ} + 𝑙𝑡𝑟∈𝑅 (6) 
where 𝑙 indexes price bins and 𝑡 indexes time. The dependent variable 𝑆𝑙𝑡 measures the number 
of new build transactions in bin 𝑙 at time 𝑡. The first two sums provide an estimate of the 
counterfactual price distribution. The first sum is a third-degree polynomial on the distance 
between price bin l and the cutoff of £600,000. The second sum estimates fixed-effects for 
round numbers, with ℕ representing the set of natural numbers and 𝑅 =
{5000, 10000, 25000, 50000}  representing a set of round numbers. We estimate this equation 
with data for new build transactions in England taking place after April of 2013 (the 
introduction of HtB in England). We then obtain differences between this estimated 
counterfactual distribution and the observed distribution of prices to estimate bunching effects 
induced by HtB.  
The difference between the size of the spike just under the threshold and the gap just after the 
threshold can be used to estimate the size of the local effect of HtB on new building activity. 
This can be driven by changes in the types of properties sold after accounting for local shifting 
in prices induced by the policy.  
3.4. Main Results 
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3.4. 1. Visual Evidence of Boundary Discontinuity 
We first provide a series of graphs that illustrate our main results. Figure 7 represents the prices 
for newly built units at different distances from the GLA boundary. Positive distances 
correspond to locations inside the GLA, while negative distances refer to locations outside of 
this area. Circles depict the mean value of new build house prices for 500-meter-wide distance 
bins with the size of each circle being proportional to the number of observations in that bin. 
Lines in both panels represent fitted values from 2nd order polynomials estimated separately on 
each side of the boundary.  Gray bands around them represent 95% confidence intervals.22 
Panels A and B illustrate results before and after the introduction of London HtB, respectively. 
Comparing both panels, we find that a discontinuity in prices at the boundary emerges after the 
implementation of London’s HtB. We interpret this as evidence that differences in the size of 
available equity loans at the boundary led to a significant and positive effect on the price of 
newly built properties within London. We test this formally in Section 3.4.2. 
Figure 8 illustrates our results for the new build price effect at the English/Welsh border. Circles 
depict the mean value of house prices for 1000-meter-wide distance bins.  As above, solid lines 
represent 2nd degree polynomials estimated on both sides of the boundary.23  In this case, 
however, we do not observe a spatial discontinuity of house prices in either Panel A or B. 
Hence, the difference in the scheme at the border – the eligibility price threshold is twice as 
large in England as in Wales – did not generate an appreciable difference in new build prices.   
We conduct a similar exercise looking at changes in construction volumes at these boundaries 
before and after the corresponding changes in HtB. Results are illustrated in Figures 9 and 10. 
The former shows construction as measured by new build sales near the GLA boundary with 
Panels A and B corresponding to the periods prior and post implementation of London HtB, 
respectively. We do not find a spatial discontinuity in homebuilding at the London boundary in 
either period. Figure 10 shows results for the English/Welsh border before and after the English 
HtB policy was implemented. In this case, we find a clear discontinuity emerging in Panel B, 
indicating more building took place on the English side of the boundary after the policy was 
introduced.  
22 We report 2nd degree polynomials in these figures because they yield a lower Akaike Information Criterion 
statistic than 1st degree polynomials. Appendix Figure A2 reports results when using linear equations on either 
side of the boundary. 
23 Appendix Figure A3 reports results when using a linear polynomial. 
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Finally, we conduct a placebo experiment using properties sold around the Greater Manchester 
boundary to test whether any spatial discontinuities in prices emerge after the introduction of 
London HtB in 2016. Note that the intensity of the policy is identical inside and outside the 
Manchester boundary. Results are provided in Figure A4 in the Appendix. As expected, we 
observe no discontinuity in prices at the boundary before or after the London HtB policy was 
put in place. 
Overall, these graphs indicate that more generous versions of the policy triggered a price 
response in the supply inelastic areas around London. Conversely, the policy generated a 
quantity response in the relatively supply elastic areas around the English/Welsh border. This 
is in line with the intuition that price or quantity responses to shifts in demand depend on the 
shape of the supply curve, as illustrated in the theoretical framework provided in Section 2.2. 
In the following two sections, we present reduced-form estimates for the magnitudes of these 
effects.  
3.4.2. Effect of HtB on House Prices 
Table 4 summarizes the results from estimating equation (3) using the sample of transactions 
of new build properties within 5 kilometers from the GLA boundary. Different sets of covariates 
are included sequentially from columns 1 to 5. Column 1 controls for time effects and 
independent linear terms in distance of each property to the GLA boundary. Column 2 adds a 
vector of housing characteristics such as total floor area, type of the property, and tenure of the 
property. Column 3 adds postcode fixed effects. In column 4 we include neighborhood 
characteristics from the census interacted with year effects. Finally, in column 5, we allow for 
heterogeneous spatial price trends by controlling for interactions between distance from the 
GLA boundary and year dummies. Our preferred specifications are controlling for property 
characteristics. The standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the postcode level to 
allow for a degree of spatial correlation in the error term.  
The resulting estimates show that London’s HtB policy increased the price of newly built 
houses inside the GLA by between 4.5% and 6.4% depending on the specification, with 4 out 
of 5 estimates being significant at the 1% level. The average property price in this sample is 
£394,703, so this finding suggests that homebuyers are paying £24,393 more to buy newly built 
properties inside the GLA because of London’s HtB (compared to the less generous English-
version of the scheme). In Section 3.7, we compare this effect to that which would result from 
the implicit interest subsidy provided by the equity loan granted by the scheme.    
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Table 5 summarizes the results from estimating equation (3) for the sample of properties around 
the English/Welsh border. Again, we successively include additional controls from columns 1 
to 5. Once we control for postcode fixed effects, we observe no significant effect of the policy 
on the price of new build sales. The point estimates in columns 3 to 5 are positive but small, 
ranging between 1.7 and 2.5%, and not statistically significant, with p-values above 0.37 in all 
specifications.  
These estimates confirm the results reported in the graphical analysis provided in Section 3.4.1 
and are also in line with the predictions highlighted in our theoretical framework. As land 
supply is relatively inelastic near the GLA boundary, the shift in demand induced by HtB is 
capitalized into prices. Near the English/Welsh border, where developable land is available, the 
response is more likely to happen in quantities rather than prices. Naturally, this hypothesis is 
testable; we estimate the effect of HtB on housing supply in the next section.  
3.4.3. Effect of HtB on Housing Construction 
Table 6 summarizes the results from estimating equation (4) for the sample including all wards 
within 5 kilometers of the GLA boundary. We define the post-HtB period as extending from 
February 2017 to December 2018, – starting one year after the implementation of London’s 
HtB – to allow for a one-year construction lag. From Table 6, we observe that London’s HtB 
did neither have a significant effect on construction volumes nor on the probability that any 
newly built property was sold in a ward. Coefficients are insignificant and small in all 
specifications, indicating that the increase in the size of available equity loans at the boundary 
did not lead to an increase in housing supply.  
In Table 7, we provide estimates of equation (4) for wards around the English/Welsh border. 
As above, the post-treatment period is defined as starting one year after the introduction of the 
English HtB-scheme. We find a significant and positive effect of HtB on housing construction 
in all specifications. Our estimates suggest that the higher eligibility threshold on the English 
side of the boundary increased the number of new build transactions at each ward by 0.42 on 
average, and the propensity for any new build construction at each ward by 7.8%. These results 
are consistent with the predictions from our theoretical framework that indicate that HtB has 
differential effects in London and the areas around Wales as a consequence of differences in 
supply conditions in the two areas. 
3.4.4. Effect of HtB on Financial Performance of Developers 
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Our findings in previous sections indicate that HtB increased demand, translating into higher 
house prices or building outputs. How did this affect the financial performance of residential 
developers? Table 8 presents our estimates for the effect of the scheme on revenues, gross 
profits and net profits before taxes, obtained from a developer panel as detailed in Section 3.3.3. 
Panel A presents estimates of the effects for our continuous measure of HtB participation using 
our intensity sample. The first column shows that a 1 percentage-point increase in the fraction 
of HtB properties supplied by a developer, leads to a 1.1% increase in revenue. The effect is 
large and significant. The estimates for gross profits and net profits, displayed in columns 2 and 
3 are even larger, indicating that changes in costs – e.g. costs of acquiring land – did not 
neutralize the changes in revenue. Hence, these estimates suggest that the policy improved the 
performance of residential developers. The estimate in column 4 measures the effect of the 
policy on operating and interest expenses, obtained by taking the difference between gross and 
net profits. The effect is positive and significant for both samples. 
Panel B of Table 8 shows estimates using our larger Difference-in-Differences sample, where 
participation in HtB is measured using a dummy variable taking value 1 if the developer is 
registered with one of the regional HtB offices in the country. Participation in the program 
appears to increase revenues substantially, with program participants obtaining over 60% 
higher revenues than non-participants.24 Again, the coefficients for gross and net profits are 
even larger. The estimate in column 4 of Panel B tells us that operating plus interest expenses 
of companies registered with the program increased by 36% relative to the control group. The 
policy is unlikely to have had an impact on firm’s financing costs, so we interpret this as 
suggestive evidence that the scheme affected the operating costs of the developers, possibly 
including management costs. 
In Figure 11, we display yearly average profits adjusted for individual company fixed-effects 
for the HtB and non-HtB groups of developers before and after the policy. The pre-trends are 
reasonably parallel, and we observe a divergence after 2013, with substantial growth for 
developers registered for HtB. These results reinforce the notion that developers improved their 
financial performance as a result of HtB. An additional implication is that, on the supply side 
of the residential market, the benefits of the scheme did not go exclusively to land owners.  
Some caution is warranted when interpreting these findings. Both the intensity and Difference-
in-Differences samples used to produce the estimates in Table 8 cover a small number of 
24 The coefficient 𝛽 is 0.49, so we can write the proportional difference in revenues is Δ𝑟 = 𝑒0.49 − 1.
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relatively large developers and are only partially representative of the entire industry. In 
addition, there are substantial observable differences in characteristics between the developers 
self-selecting into the scheme and other developers in the sample. For example, luxury 
developers typically are in the control group, as they will not normally be registered with HtB. 
Our estimates can be interpreted causally only if we consider that these differences have a time-
invariant influence on performance. Unfortunately, lack of detailed information on the location 
of developers’ assets prevents us from deploying the spatial techniques used in our analysis of 
price and construction effects.  
3.5. Additional Results 
3.5.1. Bunching Effect 
The English HtB program led to significant bunching of sales right below the price threshold. 
Figure 12 shows two histograms of new build frequencies for prices between £550,000 and 
£650,000. The left-panel represents properties sold in the period from January 2012 to March 
2013, before the implementation of HtB in England. The right-panel corresponds to a histogram 
for properties sold between April 2013 and December 2018, after HtB was introduced. We 
observe a substantial increase in the amount of bunching in the price distribution of new builds 
just below £600,000 between the two periods.  
One issue to take into account when identifying the degree of bunching at that price level is 
given by round-number bunching. As shown in Figure 12, there was already some bunching at 
the £600,000 thresholds before the policy was in place. To deal with this initial level of 
bunching we first use the total number of sales to normalize for a baseline level of round-
number bunching. In Appendix Figure A5 we first group sales into £10,000 price bins and then 
plot the evolution of the fraction of new builds over total sales for each bin from 2012 to 2018. 
The black line represents the price bin of interest, £590,000 to £600,000. Grey lines correspond 
to the other bins between £510,000 and £700,000. We can see that a gap between black line and 
the grey lines appears in 2013 and widens substantially from 2015, implying a significant 
amount of bunching of new builds at £600,000 after this year, after accounting for round-
number bunching in the price distribution of all sales. Figure A6 shows the fraction of new 
builds over total sales for £5000 price bins averaged over the period between April 2013 and 
December 2018. Horizontal dashed lines represent averages above and below the £600,000 
threshold. We also observe significant bunching at £600,000. 
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Figure A7 illustrates the difference between the observed density of property transactions and 
our estimated counterfactual density around the £600k notch.25 The counterfactual distribution 
is obtained by estimating equation (6).  We observe substantial bunching below the cut-off of 
£600,000 and a large hole in the distribution above the cut-off. Using our counterfactual price 
distribution, we estimate there are 2,033 more transactions for properties valued from £590,000 
to £600,000 and 982 less transactions for properties valued from £600,000 to £630,000.26 These 
estimates suggest that HtB leads to a significant shift in housing construction away from 
properties above the price threshold, towards properties below the threshold. We relate this to 
changes in the size of built units in the next section. 
Figures A8 and A9 indicate that the Welsh HtB program also led to significant bunching of 
sales right below the price corresponding to the £300,000 threshold.  Figure A8 plots histograms 
of the Welsh new build price distribution between £250,000 and £350,000 before and after the 
introduction of the Welsh version of the scheme. Figure A9 shows the fraction of new builds 
over total sales  for different prices levels. Horizontal dashed lines represent averages above 
and below the £300,000 threshold. We also observe significant bunching at £300,000. 
The fact that bunching is also observed in Wales is important because it shows that the £300,000 
threshold induces a change in market outcomes, and a local increase in demand. It therefore 
motivates the strategy used to measure price and quantity effects at the English/Welsh border. 
3.5.2. Size Effect 
We can also apply a Difference-in-Discontinuities design to estimate the effect of HtB on the 
size of newly built housing units. Appendix Tables B2 to B5 summarize the results. We use 
data on the size of new build transactions close to the GLA boundary and the English/Welsh 
border respectively, using the estimation samples discussed in Section 3.3.1. We allow for a 
delayed response of one year so that the post-HtB period starts from April 2014 at the 
English/Welsh border and from February 2017 at the GLA boundary. We include additional 
variables sequentially from columns 1 to 5. Only the coefficients and standard errors for the 
key treatment estimates of HtB are reported.  
Table B2 estimates negative but insignificant effects of the London HtB scheme on new build 
size. When we restrict the sample to properties under £600,000, we do find a negative, 
marginally significant and non-negligible effect on size. According to Table B3 the size of 
25 See Section 3.3.4 for details on the estimation of this counterfactual density.  
26 These numbers amount, respectively, to 10.4% and 5% of all sales in the £550000-£650000 range. 
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newly built housing units inside GLA is 3.1% smaller post implementation, than new builds 
just outside. Together with the results for bunching for England, this suggests that developers 
adjusted the characteristics of properties to meet the HtB conditions. Tables B4 and B5 report 
estimates of the size effect at the English/Welsh border; we observe overwhelmingly negative 
but statistically insignificant results.  
3.6. Robustness Checks 
3.6.1 Displacement of Homebuyer Demand Across Boundaries 
The potential displacement of demand across either the English/Welsh or GLA boundaries is 
an important threat to our identification strategy. Displacement could occur if the policy induces 
short-distance sorting of prospective buyers so that, for example, demand for housing falls 
outside the GLA boundary as a result of the policy. This would violate the stable unit treatment 
vale assumption required to interpret our quantitative estimates of the price or construction 
effects as the outcome of the policy. Fortunately, if we assume demand displacement is 
relatively local – i.e. occurring mostly over short distances – we can use our samples to evaluate 
whether this is indeed a problem and what is its impact on each set of estimates. We do so with 
two different strategies. 
In our first strategy, we reproduce our Difference-in-Discontinuities baseline estimates, 
sequentially dropping the transactions closest to the boundary. If the displacement of demand 
across the boundary of interest is important and happens over relatively short distances, then 
excluding observations next to the boundary should partially correct our estimates for demand 
sorting.27 Estimates for the price effect of London’s HtB obtained after excluding different 
bands around the GLA boundary are reported in Panel A of Appendix Figure A10. We observe 
that we can exclude transactions taking place within up to at least 2.5km of the GLA boundary 
without a significant effect on our estimates. In Panel B, we report an analogous figure for the 
area around the English/Welsh border. Again, excluding observations around the border does 
not affect the conclusion that differences in the HtB scheme’s generosity did not lead to a 
significant price effect. 
It is also possible that our housing supply estimates of the effects of the different schemes are 
biased by demand sorting. To explore this, we obtain estimates after iteratively excluding wards 
27 To prevent this sample restriction from compromising the precision of our estimates, we expand the bandwidth 
around the boundary, so that the width of the regions used in our analysis remains unchanged. 
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around the boundary. 28  Results for the construction effect on the Welsh boundary under 
different sample restrictions are provided in Panel A of Appendix Figure A11. We observe that 
coefficients are fairly stable between 3% and 6%. We also report the coefficients on the supply 
effect at the GLA boundary across subsamples in Panel B. All coefficients are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, and point estimates are smaller in absolute value than the 
coefficients for the Welsh boundary.  
In our second strategy to deal with the problem of demand displacement, we seek to directly 
test whether there is any evidence of displacement across our boundaries of interest. To do so, 
we follow the intuition in Turner et al. (2014) and compare transaction prices close to and far 
away from the boundary within each side.29   
When looking at the role of demand displacement around the GLA, we split the London sample 
into two sub-samples corresponding to property sales on each side of the boundary. The 
displacement hypothesis has specific predictions regarding how demand changes within each 
spatial band around the border. In the case of the sub-sample of properties inside of the GLA, 
a local displacement of demand would result in an increase in new build prices close to the 
boundary relative to prices further inside the region. Conversely, for sales outside of the London 
region, displacement of demand would reduce prices close to the boundary relative to prices 
further out into the periphery. These predictions are easily testable using a modified version of 
equation (3) in which we replace 𝐻𝑇𝐵𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 with 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡, where 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖 is a dummy 
taking value 1 for properties within 2.5 or 5km of the boundary in the London and Welsh 
samples, respectively. Estimates for London, split by sub-sample are reported in Appendix 
Table B6. We find little evidence of displacement. The point estimates are negative or very 
small for both sub-samples, and generally not statistically significant. The largest negative point 
estimates are observed inside of London. Taken at face value, these are not consistent with the 
displacement hypothesis, as they suggest a reduction in demand close to the boundary in the 
London sub-sample.  
Statistical power is quite low in these sub-samples, partly because we are using a binary to 
capture distance. To avoid this, we can use another modified version of equation (3) but now 
replacing 𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 with 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 is a linear term in distance to the GLA 
boundary. Estimates for the coefficient on 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 for each sub-sample are provided in 
28 As above, we expand the bandwidth accordingly to ensure that we have sufficient observations to obtain reliable 
estimates. 
29 Specifically, we follow the approach in the external effect regressions in Section 2.5 of Turner et al. (2014). 
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Appendix Table B7. Coefficients are generally insignificant, and small. Importantly, none of 
the coefficients for the GLA subsample are negative, as displacement would predict in this case. 
We conclude from these analyses that local displacement of demand across the London 
boundary is not present or is negligible.  
We also test directly for evidence of displacement across the English/Welsh border by 
estimating a version of equation (4) in which 𝐻𝑡𝐵𝑗 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−12  is replaced with 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑗 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−12 where 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑗 is a dummy taking value 1 for wards with centroids within 5km of the 
boundary. We estimate this separately for the English and Welsh sub-samples around the 
border. Results are reported in Appendix Table B8 and are not consistent with the pattern that 
would emerge if displacement of demand across the boundary was significant. A similar 
analysis using a linear term for distance in the interaction is reported for completeness in 
Appendix Table B9. 
Collectively, these set of estimates indicate local demand displacement is either not taking place 
or is rather negligible. As a result, we believe this is unlikely to induce a substantial bias in our 
baseline estimates of the effects of HtB.    
3.6.2. Robustness of Price Effects 
We conduct a battery of checks to evaluate the robustness of the estimated effects of the scheme 
on prices. Our first set of checks reproduces results using different bandwidths around the 
London boundary and the English/Welsh border. Results with alternative bandwidths for each 
exercise are reported in tables B10 and B11, respectively, and indicate no substantial difference 
in estimated effects.  
We also conduct a placebo check using the boundary of Greater Manchester. No specific 
scheme was put in place in this area, so the eligibility conditions and the maximum size of the 
loan are continuous at this boundary. Estimates for this placebo test are reported in Table B12 
and indicate no statistically significant price effect, as expected. 
3.6.3. Robustness of Construction Effects 
Our construction estimates allow for a one-year construction lag. In Tables B13 and B14 we 
replicate the results reported in Tables 6 and 7 using contemporaneous construction effects (i.e., 
the post-treatment-period is defined as the implementation date of the policy). Again, we find 
that HtB does not have a significant impact on housing construction at the GLA boundary but 
increases construction significantly at the English/Welsh border. We also find no significant 
contemporaneous construction effect for Greater Manchester, our placebo area (Table B15). 
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3.6.4. Difference in Timing of Implementation at the English/Welsh Border 
The English version of HtB was implemented 9 months before the Welsh version was 
introduced. Thus, the estimated effects obtained for the Welsh border have to be interpreted as 
weighted averages of the impact of the difference eligibility conditions of HtB at the boundary 
(i.e., the fact that the price threshold on the English side of the border is twice that as in Wales) 
and differences arising from the timing of implementation in both locations. To cleanly identify 
the effect of the different eligibility conditions, we drop observations between April and 
December 2013 (i.e., the time period with only English HtB) for our price estimates. The pre-
period goes from January 2012 to March 2013 and the post period is January 2014 to December 
2018. The estimates for the effect on prices are reported in Appendix Table B16 and continue 
to be statistically insignificant at all conventional levels.  Results for construction are reported 
in Appendix Table B17 and indicate a positive and significant effect of the difference in 
eligibility conditions on transaction volumes, similar to the one reported in Table 7. 
3.7. Back-of-the-Envelope Calculation of Price Effect 
Our empirical results indicate that the introduction of London’s HtB led to a 6% increase in 
house prices inside the GLA. The policy effect can operate via two main channels. First, as 
discussed in the theoretical section, the reduction in required down-payments can increase 
demand, leading to higher prices. Second, the government equity loan has a lower interest rate 
than that typically paid for mortgage loans and during the first five years the equity loan carries 
no interest. This interest rate subsidy could also result in higher demand, and an increase in 
prices. Because both effects are bundled together with the policy, it is not easy to disentangle 
them empirically. However, we do know the size of the interest rate subsidy in each period. We 
can combine this with prevailing interest rates on mortgages, discount rates and reasonable 
assumptions for the expected appreciation of house prices to obtain the present discounted value 
of that subsidy. Using these numbers, we can decompose the 6% total price effect into an 
interest-rate subsidy and a credit relaxation effect. 
We compare discounted cash flows for two hypothetical households buying a property using 
different forms of financing. Household A buys a property using a London HtB equity loan for 
40% of the property’s value, a 55% LTV mortgage and a 5% down-payment. Household B buys 
a property of the same price using an English HtB equity loan for 20% of the property’s value, 
a 75% LTV mortgage and a 5% down-payment. For the sake of simplicity, we consider a 10-
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year time window.30 We also assume that both mortgages are 10 year fixed-rate with equal 
rates. Under these assumptions, the value of the interest-rate subsidy accruing to household A 
can be obtained by comparing two figures: i) the discounted value of payments for a 20% 
reduced-interest HtB-equity loan after subtracting the proceeds from saving the 20% cash 
excess in a standard household portfolio, and ii) the stream of payments arising from a 20% 
non-HtB 10-year fixed rate mortgage.  
HtB equity mortgages require no interest paid in the first 5 years since the purchase. After that, 
the interest rate is 1.75% × (1 + (1%+Retail Price Inflation)). Assuming the RPI stays constant 
at 2.9% (the average rate between 2016 and 2018), we can trace out future payments on all HtB 
loans. We assume a 10-year fixed-rate mortgage pays a nominal interest of 3.27% based on the 
Bank of England data of rates for January 2016. This pins down the path of interest payments 
for mortgages. The interest on savings is assumed to be equal to 1.4%, which is also taken as 
the discount rate in our present value calculations.31 Finally, the expected yearly growth rate 
for house prices – necessary to value foregone capital gains on the 20% equity stake of the 
government – is assumed to be 2.4%, which was the average rate of growth between 2008 and 
2018. 
Based on these assumptions, we find that the net present value of the interest rate subsidy is 
2.31% of the value of the purchased property. This figure is slightly under 40% of our total 
estimated price effect, indicating that most of the effect of London HtB on prices operates via 
a relaxation of household credit conditions.  
The calculated present discounted value of the interest rate subsidy depends on our assumptions 
regarding mortgage rates, inflation expectations, etc. A sensitivity analysis reveals this figure 
is particularly responsive to the expected appreciation rate of house prices and the return on 
savings. A high appreciation rate of prices reduces the value of the subsidy. A high return on 
savings has the opposite effect. Yet, given the other parameters of the exercise, either the 
expected capital gains should be unreasonably small (i.e. lower than 0.5%), or the returns on 
30 Specifically, we assume household A pays off half of the equity loan in a single installment in year 10 and 
household B pays off an equivalent amount of the mortgage in the same way. After these payments, both agents 
are left with a HtB loan amounting to 20% of the property’s initial price and a mortgage amounting to 55% of the 
initial price (minus any amortization paid in the intervening years).  
31 The interest on savings is computed after observing assets held by recent buyers – buyers purchasing property 
in the previous two years - as recorded in the 2016 Wealth and Assets Survey. Most households in this group have 
their wealth in a combination of traditional savings accounts and ISAs (Individual Savings Accounts). One-year 
limited access ISAs are particularly popular, and they pay an interest of roughly 1.4%. Only about 1 in 10 recent 
buyers hold stock or other risky assets. The average portfolio of a recent buyer by size – which is not quite 
representative of the most common portfolio – includes a 10% invested in stock. This increases total return on 
savings to roughly 2.6%.  
29 
investment unreasonably large (i.e. as large as mortgage rates), for the interest subsidy to 
explain away our price effect. Hence, we conclude that there is indeed overcapitalization of 
interest rate subsidies and interpret this overcapitalization as a result of reduced down-payment 
requirements.  
4. Discussion and Conclusions
In 2013 the UK government announced the HtB scheme, which provides different forms of 
assistance to households aiming to buy a property as owner-occupiers. We exploit differences 
in the intensity of implementation of the policy’s Equity Loan Scheme across two regional 
boundaries to estimate the effect of the policy on the price of newly built homes and on 
construction volumes. We estimate different effects depending on the boundary under 
consideration. In the case of the GLA, we find that the more generous London HtB program 
led to higher new build prices but had no discernible effect on construction volumes. Both of 
these effects are arguably contrary to the policy’s objectives which are to improve affordability 
and promote new construction.  
The estimated effects of the policy are more encouraging in the relatively supply-elastic markets 
around the English/Welsh border, with no significant effect on prices and a substantial and 
statistically significant effect on construction activity. Yet, the housing affordability crisis in 
the UK tends to be most severe in the supply inelastic markets of the South East and especially 
in the GLA.  
Our findings suggest that HtB has stimulated housing construction in the ‘wrong areas’; that is, 
it has stimulated construction in areas where planning constraints are less rigid and it is 
therefore comparably easy to build, not in areas where productivity and employment 
concentration are highest and new housing is most needed. This is consistent with observed 
patterns in the intensity of HtB-construction across England and Wales (see Appendix Figure 
A12): The policy has led to the construction of housing outside of the green belt areas of the 
most productive agglomerations in the UK (London, Oxford and Cambridge). This is in line 
with other stylized facts that suggest that workers increasingly commute excessively long 
distances through green belts to get from their place of residence to their work place.  
Contrary to the policy’s title, HtB may not have ‘helped’ the population of credit constrained 
households in the most unaffordable areas of the country. There are two reasons for this. First, 
the policy pushed up house prices, increasing housing costs rather than housing consumption 
in square meters. Only developers or land owners, not new buyers, benefited from the policy-
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induced price increases. The price effect limits substantially the impact of the policy on the 
affordability conditions faced by credit constrained households. Second, the design of the HtB 
Equity Loan Scheme is such that those borrowers who took advantage of the scheme to gain 
access to the owner-occupied housing ladder, unlike existing homeowners, do not participate 
in the same way in future capital gains. This is because, at the time of sale, they have to pay 
back the equity loan at market value. If the price increases, so does the amount that the borrower 
owes the government. Ultimately, HtB arguably did little to ‘help’ young credit constrained 
households in unaffordable areas.  
So who benefited from HtB, if not the credit constrained households in the most unaffordable 
areas? Landowners in supply constrained areas (including developers who held land in those 
areas prior to the policy’s implementation) are likely beneficiaries. Moreover, our analysis of 
the financial performance of developers indicates that the developers benefited too. Our 
findings reveal that HtB increased revenues, profits and operating expenses of those developers 
intensively engaged in the HtB business. This suggests that HtB not only had limited effects on 




Equity Loan Scheme in Different Regions in UK (applies to new build only) 
Region Introduction date House value up to Loan from government 
England April 2013 £600,000 Up to 20%
London February 2016 £600,000 Up to 40% 
Wales January 2014 £300,000 Up to 20% 
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Table 2: 
Descriptive Statistics: Regression Sample 
Observations     Mean SD Max Min 
Panel A: London, price effect 
House price 32127 394703.1 290817.7 7850000 27720 
HtB treatment 32127 0.26 0.44 1 0 
Inside GLA 32127 0.6 0.49 1 0 
Post London HtB 32127 0.45 0.5 1 0 
Total floor area 32127 87.27 49.77 797.5 0 
Terrace 32127 0.18 0.38 1 0 
Flat 32127 0.65 0.48 1 0 
Detached 32127 0.08 0.27 1 0 
Semi-detached 32127 0.09 0.29 1 0 
Leasehold 32127 0.67 0.47 1 0 
Energy consumption 32127 98.47 67.49 1038 -124 
Fireplace 32127 0.12 0.33 1 0 
CO2 emissions 32127 1.4 1.08 36.9 -1.8 
Distance to boundary 32127 2492.09 1392.62 4999.27 4.75 
Panel B: English/Welsh border, price effect 
House price 8471 234201.7 111031.9 1550000 16260 
HtB treatment 8471 0.48 0.5 1 0 
Inside GLA 8471 0.47 0.5 1 0 
Post English HtB 8471 0.88 0.33 1 0 
Total floor area 8471 102.21 41.63 575 0 
Terrace 8471 0.18 0.39 1 0 
Flat 8471 0.13 0.34 1 0 
Detached 8471 0.49 0.5 1 0 
Semi-detached 8471 0.2 0.4 1 0 
Leasehold 8471 0.27 0.44 1 0 
Energy consumption 8471 102.33 42.7 1076 -19 
Fireplace 8471 0.11 0.31 1 0 
CO2 emissions 8471 1.84 1.23 61 -0.2 
Distance to boundary 8471 4899.43 2765.6 9980.05 11.18 
Panel C: London, construction effect (ward-level sample) 
Number of units constructed 33684 0.95 3.68 87 0 
Any new build in ward, by month 33684 0.22 0.41 1 0 
HtB Treatment 33684 0.13 0.33 1 0 
Inside GLA 33684 0.54 0.5 1 0 
Post London HtB 33684 0.27 0.45 1 0 
Distance to boundary 33684 2775.04 1630.83 9214.02 186.7 
Panel D: English/Welsh border, construction effect (ward-level sample) 
Number of units constructed 16380 0.52 1.81 73 0 
Any new build in ward, by month 16380 0.18 0.39 1 0 
HtB treatment 16380 0.27 0.44 1 0 
In Wales 16380 0.6 0.49 1 0 
Post HtB in England 16380 0.68 0.47 1 0 
Distance to boundary 16380 5420.1 3139.91 14592.72 324.18 
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Table 3: 
Supply Constraints Measures and Implied Price-Earnings Elasticities 
Table 4:  
Price Effect at GLA Boundary 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HtB 1) 0.1613*** 0.0712*** 0.0446* 0.0644*** 0.0618*** 
(0.0423) (0.0261) (0.0245) (0.0211) (0.0211) 
Year-month fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary 
on each side 
Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by 
year 3) 
No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
N 32127 32127 32127 32127 32127 
R2 0.0906 0.6232 0.9187 0.9194 0.9194 
Notes: 1) HtB captures the difference between the 40% and the 20% equity loan threshold (inside vs. 
outside GLA). 2) Housing controls include total floor area, dwelling type, the tenure of properties, whether 
the property has a fireplace, energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 
3) 
Neighborhood controls (from the
2011 Census) are the percentage of (1) married residents and (2) residents with level-4 and above 
educational qualifications at ward level. Standard errors are clustered at the postcode level. 
Region English/Welsh 
border       
GLA 
boundary     
Greater Manchester 
boundary 
Share of land in green belts 3.77% 66.5% 52.6% 
Average refusal rate 1979-2008 27.2% 35.6% 25.1% 
Average share of developed land 6.3% 27.6% 18.2% 
Average elevation range 476.0 143.9 382.3 
Implied price-earning elasticity (OLS) 0.252 0.403 0.284 
Implied price-earning elasticity (IV) 0.127 0.205 0.164 
Notes: The refusal rate, share developed land and elevation range are weighted by the surface area of the Local 
Planning Authority. Data on refusal rates, share developed land and elevation range come from Hilber and 
Vermeulen (2016). The green belt shape file comes from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government. 
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Table 5:  
Price Effect at English/Welsh Border 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HtB 1) 0.1483* 0.0867 0.0166 0.0237 0.0246 
(0.0863) (0.0532) (0.0266) (0.0293) (0.0277) 
Year-month fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary 
on each side 
Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by 
year 3) 
No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
N 8471 8471 8471 8471 8471 
R2 0.1013 0.6746 0.9224 0.9228 0.9230 
Notes: 1) HtB is a dummy taking value 1 for England after the introduction of the Help-to-Buy scheme. 2) 
Housing controls include total floor area, dwelling type, the tenure of properties, whether the property has 
a fireplace, energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 3) Neighborhood controls (from the 2011 Census) 
are the percentage of (1) married residents and (2) residents with level-4 and above educational 
qualifications at ward level. Standard errors are clustered at the postcode level. 
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Table 6:  
Construction Effect at GLA Boundary 
Dependent Variable: #New builds Dummy 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
HtB 1) 0.1683 0.1683 0.2759 0.2528 0.0203 0.0203 0.0219 0.0225 
(0.2071) (0.2083) (0.2509) (0.2444) (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0261) (0.0260) 
Year-month fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary 
on each side 
Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Ward fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by 
year 2) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No Yes No No No Yes 
N 33684 33684 33684 33684 33684 33684 33684 33684 
R2 0.0109 0.1736 0.1746 0.1751 0.0137 0.1893 0.1905 0.1909 
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1 to 4 corresponds to the number of new builds in a ward. The dependent variable in columns 5 to 8 
corresponds to a dummy taking value 1 if there was any sale of new build property in that ward-month pair. 1) HtB captures the difference between 
the 40% and the 20% equity loan threshold (inside vs. outside GLA). 2) Neighborhood controls (from the 2011 Census) are the percentage of (1) 
married residents and (2) residents with level-4 and above educational qualifications at ward level. Standard errors are clustered at the ward level. 
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Table 7: 
Construction Effect at English/Welsh Border 
Dependent Variable: #New builds Dummy 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
HtB 1) 0.4136*** 0.4136*** 0.3932*** 0.4187*** 0.0832** 0.0832** 0.0761** 0.0783** 
(0.1387) (0.1395) (0.1291) (0.1266) (0.0335) (0.0336) (0.0328) (0.0325) 
Year-month fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary 
on each side 
Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Ward fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by 
year 2) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No Yes No No No Yes 
N 16380 16380 16380 16380 16380 16380 16380 16380 
R2 0.0243 0.2544 0.2625 0.2638 0.0243 0.2502 0.2534 0.2546 
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1 to 4 corresponds to the number of new builds in a ward. The dependent variable in columns 5 to 8 
corresponds to a dummy taking value 1 if there was any sale of new build property in that ward-month pair. 1) HtB captures the difference between 
the £600k and the £300k price-threshold (English vs. Welsh side of border). 2) Neighborhood controls (from the 2011 Census) are the percentage of 
(1) married residents and (2) residents with level-4 and above educational qualifications at ward level. Standard errors are clustered at the ward level. 
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Table 8: 
Effects on Financial Performance of Developers 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




Ln((2)-(3)) Ln(cost of 
employees) 
Panel A: HtB intensity sample 
HtB intensity 1.1200** 1.4607** 2.4509* 0.8786** 0.9383*** 
× Post 1) (0.4168) (0.6219) (1.4252) (0.3222) (0.2875) 
N 193 193 193 193 193 
R2 0.9732 0.9651 0.8625 0.9059 0.9875 
Panel B: DID sample 
HtB dummy 0.4863*** 0.6781*** 1.5559*** 0.3045*** 0.4143*** 
× Post 2) (0.1510) (0.1900) (0.5577) (0.0889) (0.1346) 
N 499 499 499 499 499 
R2 0.9755 0.9733 0.8942 0.9458 0.9872 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Developer FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: 1) HtB intensity is defined as the 5-year average ratio of HtB-completions relative to all property completions by 
the developer. 2) HtB dummy equals to on if a developer is recorded with one of the HtB regional offices. Standard 




New Builds near the Greater London Authority Boundary 
Note: Solid black line represents the boundary of the Greater London Authority (GLA). Each of the black dots 
represents a new build sale taking place during our sample period within 5km of the boundary. 
Fig. 2 
New Builds near English/Welsh Border 
Note: Solid black line represents the boundary of the English-Welsh border. Each of the black dots represents a 
new build sale taking place during our sample period within 10km of the boundary. 
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Fig. 3:  
House Price Index at GLA boundary 
Note: The vertical line represents January 2016. In February 2016, GLA Help to Buy scheme was implemented. 
Fig. 4:  
House Price Index at English/Welsh Border 
Note: The vertical line represents March 2013. In April 2013, Help to Buy was implemented in England. 
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Fig. 5:  
New Building at GLA Boundary 
Note: The vertical line represents January 2017. In February 2016, GLA Help to Buy scheme was implemented. 
Fig. 6:  
New Building at English/Welsh Border 
Note: The vertical line represents March 2014. In April 2013, Help to Buy was implemented in England. 
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Fig. 7:  
Boundary Discontinuity Design: Price Effect at GLA Boundary 
Note: New build prices close to the London boundary. Positive distance: transactions inside GLA; Negative 
distance: transactions outside GLA. Circles represent averages taken within 0.5km bins, with the diameter of each 
circle corresponding to the number of sales in that bin. Lines correspond to second degree polynomials estimates 
separately on each side of the boundary. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals around those lines. 
Fig. 8:  
Boundary Discontinuity Design: Price Effect at English/Welsh Border 
Note: New build prices close to the Welsh boundary. Positive distance: transactions in England; Negative distance: 
transactions in Wales. Circles represent averages taken within 1km bins, with the diameter of each circle 
corresponding to the number of sales in that bin. Lines correspond to second degree polynomials estimates 
separately on each side of the boundary. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals around those lines. 
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Fig. 9:  
Boundary Discontinuity Design: Construction Effect at GLA Boundary 
Note: Vertical axis corresponds to the average of a dummy taking value 1 for wards with at least one new build 
sales, 0 otherwise. Circles represent averages taken within 1km bins, with the diameter of each circle corresponding 
to the number of sales in that bin. Lines correspond to second degree polynomials estimates separately on each 
side of the boundary. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals around those lines. Positive distance: 
transactions inside GLA; Negative distance: transactions outside GLA. 
Fig. 10:  
Boundary Discontinuity Design: Construction Effect at English/Welsh Border 
Note: Vertical axis corresponds to the average of a dummy taking value 1 for wards with at least one new build 
sales, 0 otherwise. Circles represent averages taken within 1km bins, with the diameter of each circle corresponding 
to the number of sales in that bin. Lines correspond to second degree polynomials estimates separately on each 
side of the boundary. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals around those lines. Positive distance: 
transactions in England; Negative distance: transactions in Wales. 
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Fig. 11: 
Developers’ Profits over Time 
Note: Vertical axis represents the log of average profits computed after removing company fixed effects 
(normalized to 0 in 2010). The vertical line represents March 2012. In April 2013, Help to Buy was implemented 
in England. 
Fig. 12: 
Histogram of House Prices in England 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Appendix Figures 
Fig. A1:  
New Builds near Greater Manchester Boundary 
Note: Solid black line represents the Greater Manchester boundary. Each of the black dots represents a new build 
sale taking place during our sample period within 5km of the boundary. 
Fig. A2:  
BDD Robustness – GLA Boundary HtB Price Effect, Linear Polynomial 
Note: Positive distance: transactions inside GLA; Negative distance: transactions outside GLA. 
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Fig. A3:  
BDD Robustness – English/Welsh Border Price Effect, Linear Polynomial 
Note: Positive distance: transactions in England; Negative distance: transactions in Wales. 
Fig. A4:  
Boundary Discontinuity Design: Placebo Manchester 
Note: Positive distance: transactions inside Greater Manchester; Negative distance: transactions outside Greater 
Manchester. 
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Fig. A5:  
Fraction of New Builds over Total Sales in England 
Note: The vertical line represents March 2014. In April 2013, Help to Buy was implemented in England. 
Fig. A6:  
The Fraction of New Builds over Total Sales in England (April 2013 to December 2018) 
Note: Vertical axis measures fraction of new build sales over total sales for £5000 width price bins. Sales 
counted in the period between April 2013 and December 2018. England only. 
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Fig. A7:  
 Estimated Bunching Effect 
Note: Counter-factual distribution of prices estimated after excluding transactions between £590k and £630k, 
and represented using a dashed line. Other details on estimation discussed in the text. 
Fig. A8:  
Histogram of House Prices in Wales 
Note: Histogram of price distribution of new build sales in Wales. 
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Fig. A9:  
The Fraction of New Builds over Total Sales in Wales (January 2014 to December 2018) 
Note: Vertical axis measures fraction of new build sales over total sales for £5000 width price bins. Sales 
counted in the period between April 2013 and December 2018. Wales only. 
Fig. A10: 
Price Effect Excluding Properties near the Boundary 
Note: Properties near the GLA boundary and the English/Welsh border are dropped respectively for the re-
estimation of HtB’s price effect. The horizontal axis represents the excluded distance. Red points correspond to 
the estimates of price effect. Vertical lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals around those estimates. 
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Fig. A11:  
Construction Effects Excluding Wards near the Boundary 
Note: Properties near the GLA boundary and the English/Welsh border are dropped respectively for the re-
estimation of HtB’s construction effect. The horizontal axis represents the excluded distance. Red points 
correspond to the estimates of construction effect. Vertical lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals around 
those estimates. 
50 
Fig. A12:  
Accumulated Help to Buy Completions (2013-2017) 
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Appendix B: Appendix Tables 
Table B1:  
Number of Transactions 
London 
5km 4 km 3 km 2 km 1 km 
Total number of sales 32127 25845 19850 14006 5149 
Postcodes 2980 2391 1824 1258 505 
Sales in treatment group  8495 6196 4596 2860 1108 
Postcodes in treatment group 604 437 338 233 94 
Wales 
10km 9km 8km 7km 6km 
Total number of sales 8471 7612 6689 6204 5827 
Postcodes 886 786 703 641 583 
Sales in treatment group  4106 3527 3155 2960 2797 
Postcodes in treatment group 428 361 324 304 278 
Notes: Number of new build property sales for bands around the GLA (top panel) or Welsh (bottom panel) 
boundaries. Bandwidths in each case indicated in the top row of the bottom and top panels.  
Table B2: 
Size Effect at GLA Boundary 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HtB 1) 0.0836** 0.0040 -0.0092 -0.0162 -0.0129 
(0.0420) (0.0160) (0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0201) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary on each side Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 3) No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
N 32051 32051 32051 32051 32051 
R2 0.0460 0.8151 0.9473 0.9475 0.9475 
Notes: Sample corresponds to new build property sales within 5km of the GLA boundary for the period between 2012 and 
2018. Dependent variable is the logarithm of the property size in square meters. 1) HtB corresponds to a dummy taking 
value 1 for properties sold inside of London after February 2017 – which is one year after the implementation of London 
HtB. 2) Housing controls include transaction price, dwelling type, the tenure of properties, whether the property has a 
fireplace, energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 3) Neighborhood controls (from the 2011 Census) are the percentage 
of (1) married residents and (2) residents with level-4 and above educational qualifications at ward level. Standard errors 
are clustered at the postcode level. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table B3: 
Size Effect at GLA Boundary (Units valued less than £600k) 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HtB 1) 0.0602 -0.0176 -0.0293* -0.0317* -0.0310* 
(0.0375) (0.0157) (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0188) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary on each side Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 3) No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
N 28500 28500 28500 28500 28500 
R2 0.0534 0.7819 0.9437 0.9439 0.9439 
Notes: Sample corresponds to new build transactions valued less than £600,000 within 5km of the GLA boundary sold 
between 2012 and 2018. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the floor area of the property in squared meters. 1) 
HtB corresponds to a dummy taking value 1 for properties sold inside of London after February 2017 – which is one year 
after the implementation of London HtB. 2) - 3) see Table B2. Standard errors are clustered at the postcode level. *, **, and 
*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Table B4: 
Size Effect at English/Welsh Border 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HtB 1) 0.0119 -0.0524** 0.0016 -0.0108 -0.0111 
(0.0557) (0.0208) (0.0221) (0.0210) (0.0197) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary on each 
side 
Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 3) No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
N 8467 8467 8467 8467 8467 
R2 0.1031 0.8151 0.9366 0.9371 0.9372 
Notes: Sample corresponds to new build transactions within 10km of the English/Welsh border from 2012 to 2018. 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the floor area of the property in squared meters. 1) HtB is a dummy 
taking value 1 in the English side of the boundary after April 2014, which is one year after the implementation of the 
English HtB. 2) - 3) see Table B2. Standard errors are clustered at the postcode level. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 
5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table B5: 
Size Effect at English/Welsh Border (Units valued less than £600k) 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HtB 1) 0.0017 -0.0534** -0.0011 -0.0140 -0.0142 
(0.0552) (0.0208) (0.0220) (0.0208) (0.0195) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary on each 
side 
Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 3) No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
N 8408 8408 8408 8408 8408 
R2 0.1080 0.8147 0.9362 0.9367 0.9368 
Notes: Sample corresponds to new build transactions within 10km of the English/Welsh border from 2012 to 2018 
valued at less than £600,000. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the floor area of the property in squared 
meters. 1) HtB is a dummy taking value 1 in the English side of the boundary after April 2014, which is one year after 
the implementation of the English HtB. 2) - 3) see Table B2. Standard errors are clustered at the postcode level. *, **, 
and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Table B6:  
Testing for Displacement Effect around GLA (Dummy) 
Sample: Inside London Outside London 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
D. Close x Post 1) -0.0689 -0.0425 -0.0118 -0.0011 -0.0478 0.0024 
(0.0553) (0.0364) (0.0330) (0.0664) (0.0379) (0.0368) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing Controls 2) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes No No Yes 
Census variables by year 3) No No Yes No No Yes 
N 19272 19272 19272 12855 12855 12855 
R2 0.1410 0.6108 0.9016 0.0613 0.6802 0.9470 
Notes: Sample in columns 1 through 3 corresponds to properties sold in the GLA within 5km of the GLA boundary. 
Sample in columns 4 to 6 corresponds to properties sold outside of the GLA within 5km of the GLA boundary. Dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of sale price in all columns. 1) Close is a dummy taking value 1 for properties within 2.5km 
of the GLA boundary. Post is a dummy that takes value 1 if individual transaction occurs after the implementation of 
London HtB. 2) - 3) see Table B2. Standard errors clustered at the postcode level.  *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 
1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table B7:  
Testing for Displacement Effect around GLA (Linear) 
Sample: Inside London Outside London 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distance x Post 1) 0.0245 0.0125 0.0122 0.0251 0.0320** -0.0106 
(0.0198) (0.0122) (0.0100) (0.0262) (0.0150) (0.0128) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing Controls 2) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes No No Yes 
Census variables by year 3) No No Yes No No Yes 
N 19272 19272 19272 12855 12855 12855 
R2 0.1413 0.6105 0.9020 0.0595 0.6779 0.9471 
Notes: Sample in columns 1 through 3 corresponds to properties sold in the GLA within 5km of the GLA boundary. Sample 
in columns 4 to 6 corresponds to properties sold outside of the GLA within 5km of the GLA boundary. Dependent variable 
is the log of property sale price in all columns. 1) Distance represents the distance from a property to the GLA boundary. 
Post is a dummy taking value 1 if an individual transaction occurs after the implementation of London HtB. 2) - 3) See Table 
B2. Standard errors are clustered at the postcode level. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
Table B8:  
Displacement Effect around English/Welsh Border (Dummy) 
Sample: Wales England 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
D. Close x Post 1) 0.2471 0.2471 0.2915* 0.2762 0.2762 0.2072 
(0.1611) (0.1621) (0.1739) (0.2338) (0.2352) (0.2246) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ward FEs No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 2) No No Yes No No Yes 
N 9828 9828 9828 6552 6552 6552 
R2 0.0157 0.2997 0.3079 0.0376 0.2355 0.2513 
Notes: Sample in columns 1 to 3 corresponds to wards in Wales within 10km of the English/Welsh border. Sample in 
columns 4 to 6 corresponds to wards in English within 10km of the English/Welsh border. Distance between ward and 
border calculated from the ward’s centroid. Dependent variable is the number of new build sales in a ward in a given month. 
1) Close is a dummy taking value 1 for wards with centroids within 5km of the English/Welsh border. Post is a dummy that
takes value 1 for year-month fixed effects post March 2014 (one year after the implementation of English HtB). 2) see Table 
6. Standard errors clustered at the ward level. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table B9:  
Displacement Effect around English/Welsh Border (Linear) 
Sample: Wales England 
Specifications (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (8) 
Distance x Post 1) -0.0427 -0.0427 -0.0511 -0.0379 -0.0379 -0.0309 
(0.0291) (0.0292) (0.0317) (0.0348) (0.0350) (0.0335) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ward FEs No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 2) No No Yes No No Yes 
N 9828 9828 9828 6552 6552 6552 
R2 0.0161 0.2998 0.3081 0.0335 0.2354 0.2512 
Notes: Sample in columns 1 to 3 corresponds to wards in Wales within 10km of the English/Welsh border. Sample in columns 
4 to 6 corresponds to wards in English within 10km of the English/Welsh border. Distance between ward and border calculated 
from the ward’s centroid. Dependent variable is the number of new build sales in a ward in a given month. 1) Distance represent 
the straight-line distance between the ward centroid and the English/Welsh border. Post is a dummy that takes value 1 for 
year-month fixed effects post March 2014 (one year after the implementation of English HtB). 2) see Table 6. Standard errors 
clustered at the ward level. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Table B10: 
Robustness – Bandwidth Selection & Price Effect at GLA Boundary 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: 2.5km Bandwidth 
HtB 1) 0.1044* 0.0414 0.0437* 0.0655*** 0.0479** 
(0.0548) (0.0330) (0.0262) (0.0226) (0.0215) 
N 17005 17005 17005 17005 17005 
Panel B: 7.5km Bandwidth 
HtB 1) 0.1243*** 0.0746*** 0.0457** 0.0619*** 0.0594*** 
(0.0352) (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0215) (0.0213) 
N 51079 51079 51079 51079 51079 
Year-month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary on 
each side 
Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 3) No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
Notes: Estimates obtained on the sample of new build properties sold within 2.5km and 7.5km of the GLA 
boundary in panels A and B, respectively. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the sale price in 
all columns.  1) HtB corresponds to a dummy taking value 1 for properties sold inside of the GLA after 
February 2016. 2- 3) see Table B2. Standard errors clustered at the postcode level. *, **, and *** represent 
10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table B11: 
Robustness – Bandwidth Selection & Price Effect at English/Welsh Border 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: 5km Bandwidth 
HtB 1) 0.0207 -0.0377 0.0179 0.0223 0.0190 
(0.0879) (0.0447) (0.0280) (0.0309) (0.0312) 
N 4864 4864 4864 4864 4864 
Panel B: 15km Bandwidth 
HtB 1) 0.1496** 0.0809** -0.0064 -0.0038 -0.0045 
(0.0635) (0.0387) (0.0195) (0.0200) (0.0203) 
N 14496 14496 14496 14496 14496 
Year-month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary on each side Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 3)  No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
Notes: Estimates obtained on the sample of new build properties sold within 5km and 15km of the English/Welsh 
boundary in panels A and B, respectively. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the sale price in all columns. 
1) HtB corresponds to a dummy taking value 1 for properties sold in England after April 2013. 2) - 3) see Table B2.
Standard errors clustered at the postcode level. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
Table B12: 
Placebo - Price Effect at Greater Manchester Boundary 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HtB (placebo) 1) 0.0313 0.0006 -0.0035 0.0083 0.0068 
(0.0550) (0.0323) (0.0182) (0.0219) (0.0210) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary on each side Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 3) No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
N 13318 13318 13318 13318 13318 
R2 0.0872 0.6764 0.9221 0.9223 0.9224 
Notes: Estimates obtained on the sample of new build properties within 5km of the Greater Manchester boundary. 1) 
HtB variable takes value 1 for properties sold in Greater Manchester after February 2016. 2) - 3) see Table B2. Standard 
errors clustered at the postcode level. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table B13:  
Robustness – GLA Boundary Contemporaneous Construction Effects 
Dependent 
Variable: 
#New builds Dummy 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
HtB 1) 0.0499 0.0499 0.1237 0.0957 0.0142 0.0142 0.0145 0.0141 
(0.1782) (0.1792) (0.2067) (0.2022) (0.0246) (0.0248) (0.0255) (0.0256) 
Year-month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to 
boundary on each 
side 
Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Ward FEs No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables 
by year 2) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No Yes No No No Yes 
N 33684 33684 33684 33684 33684 33684 33684 33684 
R2 0.0108 0.1735 0.1744 0.1750 0.0136 0.1893 0.1904 0.1908 
Note: Estimated with the sample of wards within 5km of the GLA boundary between 2012 and 2018. The dependent variable in 
columns 1 to 4 corresponds to the number of new builds in a ward. The dependent variable in columns 5 to 8 corresponds to a dummy 
taking value 1 if there was any sale of new build property in that ward-year pair. 1) HtB is a dummy taking value 1 for wards inside 
the GLA after February 2016. 2) See Table 6. Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 
5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table B14:  
Robustness - English/Welsh Border Contemporaneous Construction Effects 
Dependent 
Variable: 
#New builds Dummy 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
HtB 1) 0.3977*** 0.3977*** 0.3727*** 0.3978*** 0.0797** 0.0797** 0.0712** 0.0729**
(0.1390) (0.1398) (0.1284) (0.1280) (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0302) (0.0302) 




Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Ward Fes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables 
by year 2) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No Yes No No No Yes 
N 16380 16380 16380 16380 16380 16380 16380 16380 
R2 0.0233 0.2533 0.2615 0.2627 0.0234 0.2493 0.2526 0.2537 
Note: Estimated over the sample of wards within 10km of the English/Welsh boundary between 2012 and 2018. The dependent variable 
in columns 1 to 4 corresponds to the number of new builds in a ward. The dependent variable in columns 5 to 8 corresponds to a dummy 
taking value 1 if there was any sale of new build property in that ward-year pair. 1) HtB corresponds to a variable taking value 1 for wards 
in England after April 2013 (the exact time of introduction of English HtB). 
2) See Table 6. Standard errors clustered at the ward level in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table B15:  
Placebo - Construction Effect at Greater Manchester Boundary 
Dependent 
Variable: 
#New builds Dummy 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
HtB 1) -0.2320 -0.2320 -0.3628 -0.3653 0.0111 0.0111 -0.0103 -0.0159 
(0.2549) (0.2565) (0.2838) (0.2861) (0.0469) (0.0472) (0.0480) (0.0480) 




Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Ward FEs No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables 
by year 2) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No Yes No No No Yes 
N 14784 14784 14784 14784 14784 14784 14784 14784 
R2 0.0349 0.2361 0.2415 0.2419 0.0309 0.3012 0.3065 0.3074 
Note: Estimated over the sample of wards within 5km of the Greater Manchester boundary between 2012 and 2018. The dependent 
variable in columns 1 to 4 corresponds to the number of new builds in a ward. The dependent variable in columns 5 to 8 corresponds to 
a dummy taking value 1 if there was any sale of new build property in that ward-year pair. 1) HtB corresponds to a variable taking value 
1 for wards inside of Greater Manchester after February 2017 (1 year after the introduction of London HtB). 
2) See Table 6. Standard
errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses.  
Table B16: 
Price Effect at English/Welsh Border 
(Pre-period: Jan 2012 to Mar 2013; Post period: Jan 2014 to Dec 2018) 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HtB 1) 0.1405 0.0838 0.0270 0.0374 0.0408 
(0.0909) (0.0566) (0.0372) (0.0407) (0.0399) 
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary on each side Yes Yes No No No 
Housing controls 2) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode FEs No No Yes Yes Yes 
Census variables by year 3) No No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No No Yes 
N 7660 7660 7660 7660 7660 
R2 0.0983 0.6788 0.9225 0.9230 0.9232 
Notes: Estimated with the sample of new build properties sold within 10km of the English/Welsh boundary sold 
between 2012 and 2018 excluding properties sold between April 2013 and December 2013. 1) HtB corresponds to 
a dummy taking value 1 for properties sold in England after 2013. 2) - 3) see Table B2. Standard errors clustered at 
the postcode level in parentheses. 
60 
Table B17: 
Construction Effect at English/Welsh Border 
(Pre-period: Jan 2012 to Mar 2013; Post period: Jan 2015 to Dec 2018) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
#New builds Dummy 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
HtB 1) 0.5076*** 0.5076*** 0.4777*** 0.5098*** 0.1*** 0.1*** 0.0902** 0.0929** 
(0.1705) (0.1718) (0.1576) (0.1569) (0.0378) (0.0381) (0.0372) (0.0374) 




No No No No No No No No 
Ward FEs No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Census variables 
by year 2) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Distance by year No No No Yes No No No Yes 
N 12285 12285 12285 12285 12285 12285 12285 12285 
R2 0.0268 0.2546 0.2635 0.2648 0.0287 0.2607 0.2640 0.2655 
Note: 1 Estimated with the sample of new build properties sold within 10km of the English/Welsh boundary sold between 2012 and 2018 
excluding properties sold between April 2013 and December 2013. Dependent variable in columns 1 through 4 is the number of new builds 
sold in a ward in a given month. Dependent variable in columns 5 through 8 corresponds to a dummy taking value 1 if a ward-month pair 
has experienced any new build sales. 1) HtB corresponds to a dummy taking value 1 for properties sold in England after 2013. 2) see Table 
6. Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Appendix C: Theoretical Appendix 
Demand for New Build Housing 
Households buy a new build unit if: 
𝑢(𝑐1ℎ, ℎ) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑐2ℎ, ℎ) ≥ 𝑢(𝑐1∅, 0) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑐2∅, 0)
𝑤 ≥ (𝑃 − 𝑒)(1 + 𝑟) 
𝑒 ≥ 𝑃(1 − 𝛾) 
The first condition simply states that buying a new build is incentive compatible. Choice 
variables 𝑐𝑡ℎ and 𝑐𝑡∅, correspond to consumption in period 𝑡 = {1,2} for households buying a 
new build and households renting, respectively. For a sufficiently large value of ℎ , this 
condition is always satisfied given the assumption in footnote 3.  The second condition is 
required to ensure households buying property in period 1 are able to meet their liabilities in 
period 2. This is satisfied given that 𝑃 <
1
1−𝛾
 and assumption 𝑤 >
𝛾
1−𝛾
(1 + 𝑟). Finally, the 
third condition determines demand 𝑄𝐷 = 1 − 𝐹𝑒((1 − 𝛾)𝑃).
Derivatives of Equilibrium Price and Quantities w.r.t. 𝛾 and 𝜈 
Competitive equilibrium results in 𝑄∗ = (1 − 𝐹𝑒((1 − 𝛾)𝜈𝑄
∗)). Total differentiation w.r.t. 𝛾
leads to:  
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝛾
+ 𝑓𝑒((1 − 𝛾)𝜈𝑄
∗)𝜈 [(1 − 𝛾)
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝛾














−(1 − 𝛾)𝑓𝑒((1 − 𝛾)𝜈𝑄
∗)𝑄∗
1 + 𝑓𝑒((1 − 𝛾)𝜈𝑄∗)𝜈(1 − 𝛾)
< 0 
To obtain the derivatives for equilibrium prices, note that the supply schedule is 𝑃 = 𝜈𝑄. 






> 0   and    
𝑑𝑃∗
𝑑𝜈








Proof of Proposition 1 
Consider the general case in which 𝑒 distributed according to a general pdf 𝑓𝑒(∙). If we
differentiate A.1 with respect to 𝜈, we obtain: 






∗) [𝑄∗ + 𝜈
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝛾





∗)𝜈 [(1 − 𝛾)𝑄∗ + 𝜈(1 − 𝛾)
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝜈




The term in square brackets in the first line is strictly positive. The term in square brackets in 
the second line is strictly negative as long as 𝜈(1 − 𝛾) > 𝑓𝑒(∙) ∀𝑒. To see this, simply replace






 above. Finally, if this condition holds, the first term in square
brackets in the first line is positive and the second is negative. 
Note that, under a uniform distribution of 𝑒, the term 𝑓𝑒′((1 − 𝛾)𝜈𝑄
∗) is equal to 0. Therefore
𝑑𝑄∗
𝑑𝛾𝑑𝜈
< 0. To prove that 
𝑑𝑃∗
𝑑𝛾𝑑𝜈
> 0, we differentiate the expression for the supply schedule 𝑃 =




















For a general pdf 𝑓𝑒(∙) –  as long as we assume 𝜈(1 − 𝛾) > 𝑓𝑒(∙) ∀𝑒, we can operate with A.2
and A.3 to prove the following: If 𝑒  distributed according to pdf 𝑓𝑒(∙)  with 𝑓𝑒(∙)  strictly




< 0. If 𝑓𝑒(∙) is strictly increasing in 𝑒
and 𝜈(1 − 𝛾) > 𝑓𝑒




It is important to note that conditions imposed on 𝑓𝑒(∙)  are sufficient and not necessary.
Consider the case in which 𝑒~𝛽3,1. This pdf is strictly increasing, yet it can be shown that an 
increase in 𝛾 from 0.6 to 0.7 will result in a smaller increase in quantities when 𝜈 = 4.5 rather 
than 𝜈 = 4.32 
Proof of Proposition 2 














strictly increasing in 𝑃. Given that 
𝑑𝑃∗
𝑑𝛾




32 Code available upon request. 
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